Nietzsche now examines moral values in general. He says of every morality that “it is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from which it sprang” (149). In other words, Nietzsche’s analysis of moralities, and “moral tables,” is based on a historical account of their origins and how those origins relate to a particular way of life. Nietzsche argues that morality is “a system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life” (148). For example, Nietzsche sees Christian-European morality as the reflection of physiological decline and life-weariness.

It follows that all moral evaluations are made from the viewpoint of a specific interest in self-preservation, which can be the interest of an individual, a community of faith, or an entire race and culture. While there are many moral systems, none is correct “in itself.” This view on the nature of morality is opposed to the commonly held thesis that moral action is defined by disinterestedness, impartiality, and universal validity.

For Nietzsche, morality is not a purely “good” phenomenon. Rather, the origins of morality, how it comes into being and gains ascendency, are often what would later be considered “bad” or “evil.” For instance, the origin and establishment of a moral code may involve violent punishments, the cynical interests of certain groups such as priests, and a great deal of untruth and deception.